Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 1, 2025

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 Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, Daria Novikov, Christina Harward, and Kateryna Stepanenko

June 1, 2025, 10:30 pm ET 

Click right here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date each day alongside the static maps current on this report.

Click right here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click right here to see ISW’s 3D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (not a cellular system) is strongly beneficial for utilizing this data-heavy instrument.

Click right here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces each day by displaying a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.

Note: The knowledge cut-off for this product was 1:15 pm ET on June 1. ISW will cowl subsequent stories within the June 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukraine performed a large-scale and simultaneous sequence of drone strikes in opposition to a number of air bases in Russia on June 1. Sources inside Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) informed numerous media retailers that the SBU performed widespread first-person view (FPV) drone strikes that struck 4 air bases in Russia.[1] The SBU sources reported that Ukrainian forces struck Belaya Air Base in Irkutsk Oblast; Olenya Air Base in Murmansk Oblast; Dyagilevo Air Base in Ryazan Oblast; and Ivanovo Air Base in Ivanovo Oblast. The SBU sources confirmed that Ukrainian drone operators struck 41 Russian strategic bombers, together with A-50 long-range radar detection plane and Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 strategic bombers – fixed-wing plane that Russia makes use of to detect Ukrainian air defenses and launch cruise missiles in opposition to Ukraine. The SBU reported that the operation inflicted roughly $7 billion price of harm on Russia.[2] The SBU sources confirmed that the SBU facilitated drone strikes by transporting the FPV drones to Russia at an unspecified time; storing the FPV drones in vehicles carrying cargo items with retractable roofs; parking the vehicles close to the Russian air bases; and remotely opening the truck roofs and launching the FPVs. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed that the operation used 117 drones and destroyed 34 % of Russia’s strategic cruise missile carriers.[3] Zelensky said that Ukrainian authorities withdrew the individuals who “assisted” Ukraine with the operation from Russia earlier than the operation.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces performed FPV drone strikes in opposition to air bases in Irkutsk, and Murmansk oblasts, inflicting a number of plane to catch hearth.[5] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled all strikes in opposition to air bases in Ivanovo, Ryazan, and Amur oblasts and that Russian authorities reportedly linked Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported that Ukrainian authorities deliberate to conduct FPV drone strikes in opposition to an air base in Amur Oblast, and Russian sources claimed {that a} truck carrying FPV drones close to the Ukrainika Air Base in Amur Oblast caught hearth earlier than Ukrainian forces might launch the drones.[6]

Ukraine continues to innovate its drone expertise and ways to attain operational shock and efficiently goal Russian army infrastructure within the rear. The SBU was reportedly in a position to launch the FPV drones near the focused Russian air bases, which possible enabled the FPV drones to evade Russian digital warfare (EW) methods and deny Russian air defenders sufficient time to detect the drones.[7] The SBU revolutionary use of semi-trucks to launch the FPV drones straight in Russian territory enabled Ukrainian drone operators to strike targets deep in Russia’s rear and conduct the primary drone strike in the course of the warfare in opposition to a goal in Siberia. The SBU’s ways to make use of FPV drones and never aircraft-type long-range drones additionally allowed drone operators to take care of operational shock to inflict most injury and reduce Russia’s response window.

Ukraine’s drone strike operation in opposition to strategic Russian plane could not less than briefly constrain Russia’s means to conduct long-range drone and missile strikes into Ukraine. Ukraine’s June 1 operation focused plane that Russia makes use of to launch cruise missiles in opposition to Ukraine and airborne early warning and management (AEW&C) methods that Russia makes use of to establish Ukrainian air protection methods and coordinate Russian fighter jet concentrating on.[8] Russia repeatedly deploys Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 to launch Kh-101/Kh-555 and Kh-59/69 cruise missiles in opposition to Ukraine.[9] The downing of Russian A-50 plane has beforehand briefly constrained Russian aviation actions over Ukraine.[10] The June 1 Ukrainian drone operation will power Russian officers to contemplate redistributing Russia’s air protection methods to cowl a a lot wider vary of territory and probably deploying cellular air protection teams that may extra shortly react to potential related Ukrainian drone strikes sooner or later.[11]

Russia will possible battle to exchange the plane that Ukrainian forces broken and destroyed. Forbes reported in September 2023 {that a} single A-50 plane prices roughly $500 million, and the Kyiv Independent reported on June 1 that Russia has lower than 10 A-50s in operation.[12] Ukrainian army observer Yuriy Butusov said on June 1 that Ukrainian forces destroyed some strategic plane that Russia doesn’t presently produce.[13] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russia not produces chassis for the Tu-95 and Tu-22 bombers and famous that the chassis are inconceivable to exchange.[14] The Economist reported on June 1 that Russia possible has fewer than 90 operational Tu-22, Tu-95, and Tu-160s in whole.[15] Ukrainian sources have not too long ago famous that Russia is more and more utilizing Sukhoi plane — and never strategic bombers — to launch cruise missiles.[16] Russia possible turned to Sukhoi plane in order to not danger their strategic bombers, suggesting that Russia is worried about its restricted portions of strategic bombers.

Russian officers and milbloggers proceed guilty Russian management for failing to defend Russian army infrastructure from Ukrainian drone strikes — a widespread criticism all through the warfare after profitable Ukrainian strikes. Russian State Duma Deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) retired Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev (who has beforehand criticized the Russian MoD and whom the Duma subsequently voted to take away from his place on the Duma Defense Committee) blamed Russian particular companies for not sufficiently defending the air bases and permitting the vehicles to maneuver near the targets.[17] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian senior army management continues to ignore the necessity to shield army amenities and has been counting on the truth that many crucial army infrastructure amenities are positioned removed from Ukraine.[18] Milbloggers claimed that this angle has repeatedly led to “huge” failures and Ukraine’s means to violate Russia’s borders and airspace.[19] Milbloggers particularly criticized the Russian army command‘s decision to store strategic aircraft in open-air facilities with insufficient defenses.[20] Milbloggers have repeatedly complained about the Russian military’s failure to adapt to repeated successful Ukrainian strikes against Russia and to learn from wartime mistakes.[21]

Russian state media and milbloggers attempted to frame Ukraine’s strikes against legitimate Russian military targets as undermining Russia’s nuclear stability and as grounds for a Russian nuclear response — mirroring the Kremlin’s repeated nuclear saber-rattling throughout the war that has aimed to prevent Western support for Ukraine. Moscow-based state media outlet Moskovsky Komsomolets amplified claims from Russian political scientist Sergei Markov that the Ukrainian strikes against the air bases in Russia are grounds for the use of nuclear weapons under Russia’s nuclear doctrine because the strikes targeted Russia’s strategic nuclear potential.[22] Many Russian milbloggers, including Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers, made similar claims about Russia’s doctrinal nuclear use and explicitly called for Russia to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine in response to the strikes.[23] Russia has attempted to use nuclear rhetoric throughout the war in order to influence the West to limit aid to Ukraine or limit Ukraine’s ability to develop its own strike capabilities.[24] Russian President Vladimir Putin signed Russia’s updated nuclear doctrine in November 2024 after the United States greenlit Ukraine’s long-range strikes into Russia, and ISW assessed that these doctrinal updates were part of Russia’s efforts to push Western decision makers to shy away from providing additional support to Ukraine.[25] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s changes to its nuclear doctrine did not represent a substantial change in Russia’s nuclear posture, doctrine, or the threat of the employment of nuclear weapons and that Russian nuclear use in Ukraine remains unlikely.[26] Ukraine has notably previously destroyed Russian strategic bombers and conducted long-range strikes against Russian air bases that house strategic bombers and strategic bomber production enterprises.[27]

Russian officials blamed Ukraine for the collapse of two bridges and subsequent train derailments in western Russia on May 31, likely as part of efforts to justify the recent launch of Russian offensive operations in Sumy Oblast and the Kremlin’s disinterest in peace negotiations to end the war. Two railway bridges in Bryansk and Kursk oblasts collapsed on the night of May 31, causing two trains to derail.[28] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko responded to the derailments, stating that Russia may be conducting false flag operations to disrupt the peace process and prolong the war.[29] Russian officials and milbloggers largely blamed Ukraine for the collapsed bridges but did not provide any evidence to support these claims.[30] Russian State Duma Deputy Andrei Kolesnik claimed that Russia should respond harshly and not limit its response to the train derailments.[31] Chairperson of the Federation Council Committee on Constitutional Legislation and State Building Andrei Klishas claimed that the derailments indicate that a “terrorist group” controls Ukraine, which Klishas claimed has turned into a “terrorist enclave” without borders or legitimate authorities.[32] Klishas called for Russia to create a “vast” buffer zone in Ukraine to protect Russia from Ukrainian attacks and for Russia to “denazify” and “demilitarize” Ukraine and “reestablish” the Ukrainian state (a reference to Russia’s original war aims to replace the current legitimate Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian proxy government and to prevent Ukraine from being able to defend itself in the future). A Russian milblogger responded to Klishas, claiming that Russia should establish a “buffer zone” that extends to western Ukraine and that Ukraine should exist as a rump state with its capital in Lviv City.[33] The milblogger’s claim mirrored Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev’s recent call for Russia to control a buffer zone encompassing nearly all of Ukraine, apart from a relatively small part of Volyn and Lviv oblasts.[34]

Ukrainian authorities recently reported that Russia has deployed 125,000 personnel to the borders of Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts — two oblasts in which Russian forces are conducting offensive operations that Russian officials have framed as part of efforts to create buffer zones in Ukraine.[35] ISW continues to assess that Russian offensive efforts in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts demonstrate that the Kremlin’s territorial ambitions are not limited to the seizure of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and that Russia is attempting to delay negotiations and prolong the war in order to make additional battlefield gains.[36] Russian officials appear to be claiming that Ukraine is responsible for the train derailments at least partly in order to justify Russia’s recent launch of offensive operations in Sumy Oblast as necessary and defensive in nature. Russian officials may be trying to frame Ukraine as the party that is not interested in peace negotiations and to justify Russia’s prolongation of the war in order to achieve its original war goals.

Russian forces conducted their largest combined drone and missile strike of the war that included over 400 drones against Ukraine on the night of May 31 to June 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Kursk and Voronezh oblasts and four Kh-101 and Iskander-K air and ground-based cruise missiles from unspecified directions.[37] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 472 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Kransnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed three Kh-101/Iskander-K missiles and 213 drones over northern, eastern, southern, western, and central Ukraine and that 172 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW). Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Odesa oblasts and damaged civilian and military infrastructure.[38]

Ukrainian forces were notably unable to down any of the three ballistic missiles that Russia launched overnight.[39] Ukrainian forces have struggled to intercept ballistic missiles due to the limited supply of US-made Patriot air defense systems and interceptors.[40] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s ballistic missile strikes are forcing Ukraine to make difficult decisions about which areas of Ukraine to protect with its limited Patriot systems.[41] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat stated on May 24 that Ukrainian forces are struggling to use Patriot air defense systems to down modified Russian Iskander-M ballistic missiles due to recent Russian improvements, including enhancements that enable the missile to change trajectory and perform maneuvers rather than flying in a straight line.[42] The Economist reported on May 25 that Ukrainian government sources estimate that the Kremlin has a stockpile of 500 ballistic missiles.[43]

Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Mykhailo Drapatyi submitted his resignation following a Russian missile strike on a Ukrainian training unit on June 1. Ukraine’s Ground Forces reported that a Russian missile strike on a training unit in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on June 1 killed 12 and wounded over 60 servicemembers.[44] Drapatyi stated on June 1 that he submitted a request to resign from his position due to a personal sense of responsibility for the death of Ukrainian servicemembers.[45] Drapatyi stated that his decision to resign came as the result of being unable to ensure the proper execution of his orders and that Ukraine‘s military is disadvantaged by a command culture that is unwilling to accept personal responsibility for and learn from battlefield failures. Drapatyi stated that he must take responsibility and resign, as his efforts to root out this attitude among Ukraine’s Ground Forces failed.

Russian forces continue to adapt their strike packages in an effort to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses. Russia launched its highest number of drones in the war on the night of May 31 to June 1. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 1 that Russia is increasing the number of drones per strike each week.[46] The Economist recently reported that Russia is able to produce approximately 100 Shaheds per day, and Russia’s increasingly large drone strike packages are a direct result of this increased production.[47] Ukrainian forces reportedly were unable to down 67 out of 355 drones on the night of May 25 to 26, and Ukrainian forces reportedly were unable to down 87 out of 472 Russian drones on the night of May 31 to June 1, indicating that the Russian tactic of using huge numbers of drones is proving effective.[48]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky established a delegation to participate in peace negotiations to end the war as Russian officials continue to flout their own proposed negotiation mechanisms. Zelensky issued a decree on June 1 authorizing Ukrainian political and military officials to negotiate on Ukraine’s behalf at the upcoming bilateral Ukrainian-Russian talks in Istanbul on July 2.[49] Ukrainian Minister of Defense Rustem Umerov will lead the delegation, whose other members include deputies and representatives from the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ukrainian Navy and Air Force, the Verkhovna Rada’s Human Rights Commissioner’s Office, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU), Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU), the Office of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ Chief of Staff and Office of the President, and the Ukrainian General Staff. Zelensky explicitly authorized the delegation to negotiate a peace settlement with Russia and Ukraine’s Western partners. US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg told Fox News on May 31 that the Russia has failed to deliver a memorandum with its terms for a peace settlement and that Russian President Vladimir Putin failed to deliver the memorandum to US President Donald Trump during Putin’s proposed timeline.[50] Zelensky also stated on June 1 that Russia had but to current its memorandum to US, Ukrainian, or Turkish officers.[51]

Key Takeaways:

  • Ukraine conducted a large-scale and simultaneous series of drone strikes against multiple air bases in Russia on June 1.
  • Ukraine continues to innovate its drone technology and tactics to achieve operational surprise and successfully target Russian military infrastructure in the rear.
  • Ukraine’s drone strike operation against strategic Russian aircraft may at least temporarily constrain Russia’s ability to conduct long-range drone and missile strikes into Ukraine.
  • Russia will likely struggle to replace the aircraft that Ukrainian forces damaged and destroyed.
  • Russian officials and milbloggers continue to blame Russian leadership for failing to defend Russian military infrastructure from Ukrainian drone strikes — a widespread complaint throughout the war after successful Ukrainian strikes.
  • Russian state media and milbloggers attempted to frame Ukraine’s strikes against legitimate Russian military targets as undermining Russia’s nuclear stability and as grounds for a Russian nuclear response – mirroring the Kremlin’s repeated nuclear saber-rattling throughout the war that has aimed to prevent Western support for Ukraine.
  • Russian officials blamed Ukraine for the collapse of two bridges and subsequent train derailments in western Russia on May 31, likely as part of efforts to justify the recent launch of Russian offensive operations in Sumy Oblast and the Kremlin’s disinterest in peace negotiations to end the war.
  • Russian forces conducted their largest combined drone and missile strike of the war that included over 400 drones against Ukraine on the night of May 31 to June 1.
  • Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Mykhailo Drapatyi submitted his resignation following a Russian missile strike on a Ukrainian training unit on June 1.
  • Russian forces continue to adapt their strike packages in an effort to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses.
  • Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky established a delegation to participate in peace negotiations to end the war as Russian officials continue to flout their own proposed negotiation mechanisms.
  • Russian forces not too long ago superior in Sumy Oblast and close to Toretsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

  • Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate important efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on May 31 and June 1 however didn’t advance.[52]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported floor exercise in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on June 1.

See topline textual content for stories of Ukrainian drone strikes in opposition to Russia.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces not too long ago superior in Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage revealed on June 1 signifies that Russian forces not too long ago superior southeast of Kostyantynivka (north of Sumy City).[53]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed on June 1 that Russian forces seized Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City), but one Russian milblogger alleged that these claims are premature.[54] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces advanced to the outskirts of Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City) and near Zapsillya (just west of Myropillya).[55] Russian sources claimed on June 1 that Russian forces in Sumy Oblast have nearly advanced to within artillery range of Sumy City.[56] ISW has seen geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces are roughly 35 kilometers from Sumy City at their closest point.

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City close to Kindrativka, Oleksiivka, and Kostyantynivka and northeast of Sumy City close to Yunakivka and Oleksandriya, and towards Yablunivka on May 31 and June 1.[57]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the “Anvar” Spetsnaz detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions near the international border in Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts.[58] Drone operators of the “Rubikon” Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast, including near Atynske (northwest of Sumy City).[59] Elements of the Chechen “Zapad-Akhmat” Battalion (reportedly of the Southern Military District [SMD]); elements of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) from Kurchaloyevsky Raion, Republic of Chechnya; and elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[60] Elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kindrativka.[61] Elements of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade reportedly continue to operate near Bilovody (northeast of Sumy City).[62]

 

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kharkiv course however didn’t advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City towards Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City close to Vovchansk and Vovchanskyi Khutory on May 31 and June 1.[63]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian “Anvar Spetsnaz” detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly working within the Kharkiv Oblast border space.[64]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Capture the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kupyansk course on June 1 however didn’t make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior in northeastern Kupyansk.[65]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kupyansk, northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka, north of Kupyansk near Zapadne, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Pishchane on May 31 and June 1.[66]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Borova course on June 1 however didn’t advance.

Russian forces performed offensive operations northeast of Borova close to Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova close to Nadiya; and southeast of Borova close to Hrekivka on May 31 and June 1.[67]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces conduced offensive operations north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Karpivka, Zelena Dolyna, Novomykhailivka, and Novyi Myr and toward Shandryholove; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on May 31 and June 1.[68]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces continue to conduct infantry-led, highly attritional assaults and are leveraging prisoner recruits.[69] The spokesperson of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces are using prisoner recruits, recently mobilized servicemembers (likely referring to forces generated through Russia’s crypto mobilization schemes), and servicemembers who recently signed Russian MoD contracts.[70] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are using summer foliage to hide from Ukrainian drone strikes and observed that elements of two unspecified Russian divisions operate in the Lyman direction.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Zolotarivka and Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on May 31 and June 1.[71]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar course on June 1 however didn’t make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior north of Chasiv Yar.[72]

Russian forces attacked close to Chasiv Yar itself, south of Chasiv Yar close to Bila Hora, and southeast of Chasiv Yar close to Kurdyumivka on May 31 and June 1.[73]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, together with its 215th Reconnaissance Battalion, reportedly proceed to function within the Chasiv Yar course.[74]

Russian forces not too long ago superior within the Toretsk course.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 31 and June 1 shows Russian servicemembers holding Russian flags in northern Dyliivka (north of Toretsk) and central Zorya (west of Toretsk), indicating that Russian forces recently seized these settlements.[75]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]), Southern Military District [SMD]), seized Dachne (just southeast of Dyliivka).[76]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Krymske; northwest of Toretsk near Popiv Yar, Poltavka, Yablunivka, and Rusyn Yar; and west of Toretsk near Zorya and Nova Poltavka on May 31 and June 1.[77] Ukraine’s Khortytsia Grouping of Forces reported that Russian forces attacked with six motorcycles near Leonidivka (southwest of Toretsk).[78]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 13th “Rusich” Detachment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade) are reportedly working inside and close to Dyliivka.[79] Elements of the twenty seventh Artillery Regiment (sixth Motorized Rifle Division, third AC) are reportedly hanging Ukrainian positions close to Oleksandro-Shultyne (northwest of Toretsk).[80] Drone operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (eighth CAA, SMD) are reportedly working close to Valentynivka (southwest of Toretsk).[81] Elements of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (twentieth Motorized Rifle Division, eighth CAA) are reportedly working close to Zorya.[82] Elements of the a hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Division (eighth CAA), together with drone operators from its 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 102nd Rifle Regiment, are reportedly working close to Popiv Yar and within the course of Katerynivka and Kleban-Byk (northwest of Toretsk).[83] Elements of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, previously 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) and 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly working within the Toretsk course.[84]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Pokrovsk course on June 1 however didn’t advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk close to Myrolyubivka and Malynivka; east of Pokrovsk close to Yelyzavetivka; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk close to Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Udachne on May 31 and June 1.[85]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian eightieth ”Sparta” Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly hanging Ukrainian forces close to Boikivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[86] Drone operators of the fifty fifth Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty first CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly working within the Pokrovsk course.[87]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Novopavlivka course on June 1 however didn’t advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka close to Novoserhiivka and Novomykolaivka and towards Muravka; east of Novopavlivka close to Kotlyarivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka close to Horikhove and Zaporizhzhia on May 31 and June 1.[88]

Ukraine’s Khortytsia Grouping of Forces reported that Ukrainian drone operators destroyed a Russian Zoopark-1 counter-battery radar system within the Novopavlivka course.[89]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kurakhove course on June 1 however didn’t make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces not too long ago superior close to Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove).[90]

Russian forces performed offensive operations west of Kurakhove close to Oleksiivka, Kostyantynopil, and Bahatyr and southwest of Kurakhove close to Odradne on May 31 and June 1.[91] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Novoukrainka (northwest of Kurakhove).[92]

Russian forces continued offensive operation within the Velyka Novosilka course on June 1 however didn’t make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior east of Vesele, northwest of Vilne Pole (each northwest of Velyka Novosilka), and west of Zelene Pole (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[93]

Russian forces performed offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Vesele and Vilne Pole; west of Velyka Novosilka close to Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Zelene Pole and Novopil on May 31 and June 1.[94] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Komar (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[95]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 69th Separate Cover Brigade (thirty fifth CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly proceed to function within the Velyka Novosilka course.[96]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Maintain frontline positions, safe rear areas in opposition to Ukrainian strikes, and advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 1 however didn’t advance.

Russian forces attacked south of Orikhiv towards Novodanylivka, west of Orikhiv towards Pavlivka, and southwest of Orikhiv close to Stepove and Mali Shcherbaky on May 31 and June 1.[97]

A Russian supply claimed on May 31 that Russian forces destroyed the bridge over the T-0803 Zaporizhzhia City-Mariupol freeway in Orikhiv.[98]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (forty second Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly working close to Robotyne (south of Orikhiv).[99] Elements of the “Viking” Drone Detachment are reportedly working within the Zaporizhia course.[100]

Russian forces continued restricted offensive operations within the Kherson course on May 31 and June 1 however didn’t advance.[101]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly working within the Kherson course.[102]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)

See topline textual content for stories of Russian strikes in Ukraine.

Significant exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its army presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing vital to report.

Note: ISW doesn’t obtain any categorized materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly out there info, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially out there satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial knowledge as the premise for these stories. References to all sources used are offered within the endnotes of every replace.

[1] dot com.ua/eng/information/2025/06/1/7515052/ ; dot media/1031653-nevidomo-z-cim-delegacia-rf-poide-na-peregovori-do-stambulu-udar-po-harkivsini-1194-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1748776105&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; dot com/enemy-bombers-are-burning-en-masse-ukraines-sbu-drones-hit-more-than-40-russian-aircraft/ ; dot media/1031945-udar-po-vijskovih-letovisah-rf-gotuvali-ponad-pivtora-roku-dzerela/ ; https://t.me/suspilnenews/50766

[2] https://t.me/SBUkr/14947

[3] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14442

[4] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/standing/1929279221710664143

[5] https://t.me/mod_russia/53366

[6] https://t.me/mediazona_exclusive/3441

[7] dot com.ua/eng/information/2025/06/1/7515052/ ; dot media/1031653-nevidomo-z-cim-delegacia-rf-poide-na-peregovori-do-stambulu-udar-po-harkivsini-1194-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1748776105&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; dot com/enemy-bombers-are-burning-en-masse-ukraines-sbu-drones-hit-more-than-40-russian-aircraft/ ; dot media/1031945-udar-po-vijskovih-letovisah-rf-gotuvali-ponad-pivtora-roku-dzerela/ ; https://t.me/suspilnenews/50766

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011524

[9] ; ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2024

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030824

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2025

[12] dot ua/ru/firm/poizdka-za-160-mln-forbes-ukraine-pobuvav-za-lashtunkami-ugodi-z-kupivli-uklon-kiivstarom-shcho-otrimali-obidvi-kompanii-28052025-30033; dot com/enemy-bombers-are-burning-en-masse-ukraines-sbu-drones-hit-more-than-40-russian-aircraft/

[13] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/20247

[14] https://t.me/rybar/70909

[15] https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/06/01/an-astonishing-raid-deep-inside-russia-rewrites-the-rules-of-war

[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021125

[17] dot ru/textual content/world/2025/06/01/75532148/

[18] https://t.me/notes_veterans/23646

[19] https://t.me/notes_veterans/23646

[20] https://t.me/yurasumy/23257

[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar110724

[22] dot ru/politics/2025/06/01/markov-ataka-na-strategicheskuyu-aviaciyu-rossii-yavlyaetsya-osnovaniem-dlya-primeneniya-yao.html

[23]  ; ; https://t.me/sashakots/54028

[24] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2024

[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111924

[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9

[27] https://www.bbc.com/information/world-europe-66573842

[28] dot com/publish/53734; ; ; ; https://t.me/avbogomaz/12697

[29] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9340

[30] dot ru/information/2025/06/01/v-gosdume-zhestko-otreagirovali-na-podryv-mosta-v-belgorodskoy-oblasti/; ; ; ; ; ; dot ru/politics/information/2025/06/01/25927250.shtml; dot ru/textual content/world/2025/06/01/75532148/

[31] dot ru/politics/information/2025/06/01/25927250.shtml

[32] https://t.me/andreyklishas/4142

[33] https://t.me/notes_veterans/23639

[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525

[35] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041125

[36] ; ; ; ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050125

[37] https://t.me/kpszsu/35425

[38] ; dot media/1031653-nevidomo-z-cim-delegacia-rf-poide-na-peregovori-do-stambulu-udar-po-harkivsini-1194-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1748764585&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; ; dot media/1031653-nevidomo-z-cim-delegacia-rf-poide-na-peregovori-do-stambulu-udar-po-harkivsini-1194-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1748759002&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; ; dot media/1031835-armia-rf-vdarila-raketou-po-roztasuvannu-odnogo-z-navcalnih-pidrozdiliv-zsu-e-zagibli-ta-poraneni/

[39] https://t.me/kpszsu/35425

[40] dot com/us-approves-transfer-of-125-long-range-missiles-100-patriots-from-germany-to-ukraine-nyt-reports/; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041125

[41] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030425;

[42] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052425

[43] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025

[44] https://www.fb.com/UALandForces/posts/pfbid0kGtjsQMyM47Yeh2oWE5L7awY1X4SCS2BnxKYkD1JqakuXkrCFfFsCgifSDCDT7mml?__cft__[0]=AZVRujTiG779IehRfbaQ9XAVSuoOd-34zf_DHqCRCpNUvF8V1luyrZfX9EDLIg8TB3p0_fBCp7hMmXQGW0ay-QRUfCDDlcaFVKGWAzcow00ksxpP4G_ZCjoJE-XRKcbq6wHsMAK0JHton0VM5y2B88kGO3GL2WvPvlxz0kUUdpDmpBQCkAerOf2E0HITiKQAao0q174m1vElUpCC9eH2rX_AlGvXZmKxpMgl1yEIx4xV5277riJSmILmdbyQwADTSTf-8y1F5OFGIEZDYxS0JtAS&__tn__=%2COpercent2CP-y-R

[45] https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/articles/c5yk67y6re1o

[46] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/standing/1929279390480773565

[47] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025

[48] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025

[49] dot ua/paperwork/3592025-55161; dot ua/2025/06/01/stalo-vidomo-hto-uvijde-do-skladu-ukrayinskoyi-delegacziyi-na-peregovorah-u-turechchyni/

[50] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051925

[51] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/standing/1929279732777910393

[52]

[53] https://t.me/chornyi_stryzh/143

[54] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166796

[55] https://t.me/rybar/70881

[56] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64732

[57] https://t.me/rybar/70881

[58] https://t.me/epoddubny/23637

[59] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92626

[60] dot com/en/information/ukrainian-forces-capture-russian-marines-from-810th-brigade-in-sumy-region/

[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36591

[62] https://t.me/milinfolive/149497

[63]

[64] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92628

[65]  

[66] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64749

[67]

[68]

[69] dot com.ua/2025/06/01/takyh-myasnyh-shturmiv-ne-bulo-z-zhovtnya-rosiyany-aktyvizuvalysya-na-lymanskomu-napryamku/; https://t.me/ombr_63/1239

[70] dot media/donbas/1031895-rosijski-vijska-zoseredili-na-limanskomu-napramku-dvi-divizii-60-brigada/

[71] ; ; ;

[72] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31725

[73] ; ; ; ;

[74] ; ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92612

[75] ; ; https://t.me/SolovievLive/324107

[76] ;

[77] ; ; ; ; ; ; https://t.me/t3mny/2276

[78]

[79] ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166811

[80] https://t.me/mod_russia/53343

[81] ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166784

[82]

[83] ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166781

[84] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166784

[85] ; ; ; ;

[86] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13865

[87] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166783

[88] ; ; ;

[89] ; dot ua/2025/06/01/istoty-zalyshylysya-bez-zooparku-na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku-znyshhyly-rosijsku-rls-za-24-mln/

[90] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166796

[91] ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26895

[92] https://t.me/voin_dv/15262

[93] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166796

[94] https://t.me/voin_dv/15262

[95] https://t.me/voin_dv/15254

[96] https://t.me/voin_dv/15254

[97] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12516

[98] https://t.me/vrogov/20497

[99] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166770

[100] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166766

[101] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12516

[102]

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