[ad_1]
Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, Grace Mappes, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, Angelica Evans, and George Barros with Nate Trotter
May 30, 2025, 5:45 pm ET
Click right here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day alongside the static maps current on this report.
Click right here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click right here to see ISW’s 3D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (not a cell machine) is strongly really helpful for utilizing this data-heavy device.
Click right here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces day by day by exhibiting a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.
Note: The knowledge cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on May 30. ISW will cowl subsequent reviews within the May 31 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian officers proceed to sign the Kremlin’s uncompromising place forward of proposed talks in Istanbul on June 2, suggesting that the upcoming Istanbul assembly may be very unlikely to yield substantive ends in assist of an everlasting peace in Ukraine. Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya claimed throughout a UN Security Council assembly on May 30 that Russia is ready to struggle Ukraine for so long as essential and that Ukraine can both settle for peace, presumably on Russia’s phrases, or face inevitable battlefield defeat.[1] Nebenzya acknowledged that the United States not too long ago “opened its eyes” to the “root causes” of the struggle in Ukraine and reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin’s calls for that the West cease arming Ukraine and that Ukraine stop pressure era efforts as preconditions to a ceasefire.[2] CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and Presidential Special Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries Kirill Dmitriev additionally known as for officers to get rid of the battle‘s “root causes” in an English-language post to X on May 30.[3] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov previously defined the root causes of the war in Ukraine as NATO’s eastward expansion following the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 and the Ukrainian authorities’s alleged discrimination in opposition to Russian audio system and Russian tradition.[4] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on May 29 that Russia’s delegation to the proposed bilateral dialogue in Istanbul on June 2 would be the ”similar” as Russia’s delegation at earlier talks held in Istanbul on May 15 and 16.[5] Russia despatched a low-level delegation led by Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky and consisting of Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin, Chief of the Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU) Igor Kostykov, and Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin to the May 15-16 Istanbul talks.[6]
Russian officers’ determination to reiterate long-standing calls for and ship the identical low-level delegation to the subsequent Istanbul assembly signifies that Russia stays disinterested in participating in good-faith negotiations. ISW continues to evaluate that Russia stays devoted to protracting peace negotiations to assist continued offensive operations in Ukraine and extract extra concessions from Ukraine and the West.[7]
Russian officers are pocketing main US concessions and persevering with to make additional calls for of Ukraine and the West. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on May 30 that Kremlin officers are inspired by the Trump administration’s understanding of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s considerations about additional eastward enlargement of NATO and that Russia has beforehand shared these considerations with the United States throughout closed-door negotiations.[8] Peskov acknowledged that the US place on additional NATO enlargement is “very appealing” to Russia, on condition that the United States continues to play a mediating function in negotiations to finish the struggle.
US officers beforehand indicated a willingness to think about Russia’s objections to Ukraine’s doable future NATO membership – a long-standing Russian demand that officers continuously declare to be a “root cause” of the struggle in Ukraine – in alternate for Russia making concessions on different calls for.[9] Peskov’s assertion signifies that Russian officers assess that the United States helps Russia’s demand for NATO to change its foundational open-door coverage.[10] Such a dedication would successfully grant Russia a veto over components of the NATO constitution, disproportionally profit Russia’s desired postwar safety posture, and undermine US President Donald Trump‘s stated objectives of achieving a just and lasting peace in Ukraine. Russian officials are pocketing US concessions regarding negotiations and potential postwar security arrangements and are failing to make any comparable concessions, such as relinquishing Russia’s declare to at the moment unoccupied Ukrainian territory like Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts.
Key Takeaways:
- Russian officers proceed to sign the Kremlin’s uncompromising place forward of proposed talks in Istanbul on June 2, suggesting that the upcoming Istanbul assembly may be very unlikely to yield substantive ends in assist of an everlasting peace in Ukraine.
- Russian officers are pocketing main US concessions and persevering with to make additional calls for of Ukraine and the West.
- Russian forces not too long ago superior close to Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Kurakhove.
We don’t report intimately on Russian struggle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t immediately have an effect on the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We will proceed to guage and report on the results of those felony actions on the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes in opposition to humanity regardless that we don’t describe them in these reviews.
- Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate essential efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and probably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on May 30 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on May 29 and 30.[11] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked close to Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[12]
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian infantry assaults stay intense alongside the worldwide border between Kursk and Sumy oblasts.[13]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (seventh VDV Division) reportedly proceed to function close to the Kursk Oblast border space.[14]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported floor exercise in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on May 30.
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian goal: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine alongside the worldwide border and method to inside tube artillery vary of Sumy City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on May 30 however didn’t advance.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces not too long ago seized Vodolahy and superior close to Vodolahy, Volodymyrivka, Kostyantynivka, and Oleksiivka (all north of Sumy City), south of Bilovody, and north of Yunakivka (each northeast of Sumy City).[15]
Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City close to Veselivka, Kostyatynivka, and Vodolahy and towards Oleksiivka; and northeast of Sumy City close to Yunakivka, Loknya, Basivka, and Myropillya on May 29 and 30.[16]
A supply reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian army intelligence acknowledged that Russian offensive exercise is intensifying in northern Sumy Oblast.[17] Former head of the Ukrainian Army’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) General Mykola Malomuzh (2005–2010) supplied a speculation that Russian forces are probably concentrating forces alongside the Sumy Oblast border space in an try to create a salient between Yunakivka and Vodolahy from which Russian forces can conduct strikes in opposition to Sumy City and launch additional offensive operations.[18] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian border detachment acknowledged that Russia is leveraging the 50,000 Russian personnel who participated in retaking Kursk Oblast to assault into Sumy Oblast.[19]
Order of Battle: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited components of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade with the latest seizure of Bilovody (northeast of Sumy City).[20] Elements of the thirtieth Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, forty fourth Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly putting Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast.[21] Drone components of the “Anvar” Spetsnaz detachment (probably referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly putting Ukrainian positions in Zarichne and Sorokyne (each northwest of Sumy City).[22] Artillery components of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly putting Ukrainian positions close to Myropillya.[23]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on May 30 however didn’t make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior inside Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[24]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City close to Starytsia and Vovchansk on May 29 and 30.[25]
Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery components of the Russian “Anvar” Spetsnaz detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Starytsia.[26]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 30 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk).[27]
Russian forces continued ground assaults north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, northeast of Kupyansk close to the international border near Krasne Pershe and Kamyanka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on May 29 and 30.[28]
Order of Battle: Drone and artillery components of the Russian “Anvar” Spetsnaz detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly putting Ukrainian positions close to Milove, Chuhunivka (each north of Kupyansk alongside the worldwide border), and Kolodyazne (northeast of Kupyansk alongside the worldwide border).[29] Elements of the Russian twenty seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army (GTA), Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly working within the Kupyansk course.[30]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Borova course on May 30 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces continued floor assaults northeast of Borova close to Kolisnykivka, Nova Kruhlyakivka, and Zahryzove; east of Borova close to Kopanky; and southeast of Borova close to Hrekivka and Olhivka on May 29 and 30.[31]
A press officer of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Borova course reported that Russian forces are testing new assault ways catered to sure climate circumstances in hopes of scaling up these ways for future assaults, and that Russian forces battle to unravel issues shortly.[32] Russian forces probably search to conduct maneuvers throughout climate circumstances that degrade Ukrainian forces’ capacity to make use of drones.
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Lyman course on May 30 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior northeast and west of Ridkodub and north and south of Zelena Dolyna (each north of Lyman).[33] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces superior inside central Torske (east of Lyman) and cleared the western outskirts of Torske, however a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces nonetheless maintain positions in southern Torske.[34]
Russian forces continued floor assaults north of Lyman close to Ridkodub, Zelena Dolyna, and Lypove and towards Karpivka and Novyi Myr; northeast of Lyman close to Hlushchenkove; and east of Lyman close to Torske on May 29 and 30.[35] A Russian milblogger claimed Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Ridkodub.[36]
A Russian milblogger claimed that components of the Russian twenty fifth Combined Arms Army (Central Military District [CMD]) are offering false reviews of advances within the Lyman space. The milblogger claimed on May 26 that the twenty fifth CAA command made false claims of successes close to Torske and wasted manpower in efforts to make these claims of advance actual, and known as on Russian authorities to research.[37] The milblogger claimed on May 30 that the Russian MoD has since begun an investigation into the twenty fifth CAA command however criticized the MoD’s Fall 2024 investigations into the command of the Russian third CAA (previously 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) for falsifying claims of successes within the Siversk course (southeast of Lyman), claiming that these investigations focused milbloggers’ sources as a substitute of battlefield commanders.[38] Russian milbloggers beforehand closely criticized the command of the third CAA and its subordinate brigades for exaggerating claimed advances and obfuscating the extent of Russian army points following a number of failed massive mechanized assaults in Fall 2024.[39] The Russian MoD reportedly arrested and changed the third CAA commander, Major General Dmitry Ovcharov, and a number of other brigade commanders in November and December 2024, probably as a result of info area outcry.[40] The milblogger’s May 26 and 30 complaints counsel that Russian forces within the space proceed to misinform the upper Russian army command and that exaggerating battlefield successes up the chain stays a pervasive a part of the Russian army’s tradition.[41]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Capture the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and probably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Siversk course however didn’t advance.
Russian forces continued floor assaults northeast of Siversk close to Hryhorivka, east of Siversk close to Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk close to Ivano-Darivka on May 29 and 30.[42]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar course on May 30 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked close to Chasiv Yar itself; south of Chasiv Yar close to Bila Hora and Stupochky and towards Predtechyne; and southeast of Chasiv Yar close to Kurdyumivka on May 29 and 30.[43]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) and drone operators of the 98th VDV Division are reportedly working close to Chasiv Yar.[44]
Russian forces not too long ago superior within the Toretsk course.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on May 29 signifies that Russian forces not too long ago superior southeast of northern Dyliivka as much as the O-0519 street from the Siversky Donets Donbas canal and as much as the Dyliivka railway station in southern Dyliivka (each north of Toretsk).[45]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior north of Druzhba (east of Toretsk).[46] Another Russian milblogger claimed on May 29 that Russian forces superior to central Poltavka (northwest of Toretsk).[47]
Russian forces attacked close to Toretsk itself; east of Toretsk close to Druzhba; northwest of Toretsk towards Nelipivka; west of Toretsk close to Zorya and Romanivka; and northwest of Toretsk close to Yablunivka, Rusyn Yar, Popiv Yar, and Poltavka and towards Stepanivka on May 29 and 30.[48]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian thirty third Motorized Rifle Regiment (twentieth Motorized Rifle Division, eighth Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly working unmanned floor autos (UGVs) within the Kostyantynivka course.[49] Drone operators of the Russian “Typhoon” detachment of the “Rubikon” Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly working within the Kostyantynivka course and putting targets close to Ivanopillya (northwest of Toretsk).[50] Elements of the “Grachi” unit of the 346th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly working close to Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[51]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Pokrovsk course on May 30 however didn’t make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Shevchenko Pershe (northeast of Pokrovsk) and superior north of the settlement, in northern Myrne (northeast of Pokrovsk) and south of the settlement, and northwest of Yelyzavetivka (east of Pokrovsk).[52]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk close to Malynivka and Myrolyubivka and towards Koptieve; east of Pokrovsk close to Yelyzavetivka; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Kotlyne and Udachne on May 29 and 30.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 29 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Yelyzavetivka.[54]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, previously 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly working within the Pokrovsk course.[55]
Russian forces not too long ago superior within the Novopavlivka course.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on May 30 reveals Russian forces elevating a flag within the western outskirts of Troitske (southeast of Novopavlivka), indicating that Russian forces probably seized the settlement.[56]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka close to Novoserhiivka and Novomykolaivka on May 29 and 30.[57]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly working close to Novoserhiivka.[58]
Russian forces not too long ago superior within the Kurakhove course.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on May 30 signifies that Russian forces not too long ago superior northwest of Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove).[59]
Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove close to Andriivka, Oleksiivka, Kostyantynopil, Bahatyr, and Odradne on May 29 and 30.[60] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Novoukrainka (northwest of Kurakhove).[61]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly putting Ukrainian positions close to Oleksiivka.[62]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Velyka Novosilka course on May 30 however didn’t make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 29 that Russian forces superior in direction of Komar (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[63]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Vilne Pole, Shevchenko, and Komar; west of Velyka Novosilka close to Zelene Pole; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Novopil and Novodarivka on May 29 and 30.[64] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Novopil, Komar, and Zelene Pole.[65]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Brigade, fifth CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly working close to Novopil; components of the 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Regiment) are reportedly working close to Zelene Pole; components of the eleventh Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly putting Ukrainian positions in Komar; and drone operators of the 69th Separate Cover Brigade (thirty fifth CAA, EMD) are reportedly working within the Velyka Novosilka course.[66]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Maintain frontline positions, safe rear areas in opposition to Ukrainian strikes, and advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia City)
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported floor exercise within the Hulyaipole course on May 30.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian thirty eighth Motorized Rifle Brigade (thirty fifth Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly putting Ukrainian forces close to Zelenyi Hai (east of Hulyaipole).[67]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 30 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces carried out offensive operations southeast of Orikhiv close to Mala Tokmachka and Bilohirya, south of Orikhiv towards Novodanylivka, and southwest of Orikhiv close to Shcherbaky and Stepove on May 29 and 30.[68]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the BARS-32 detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly conducting reconnaissance operations within the Zaporizhia course.[69]
Russian forces continued assaults within the Kherson course on May 30 however didn’t advance.[70]
Order of Battle: Drone operators from the Russian 61st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly putting targets within the Kherson course, together with close to Tomyna Balka (west of Kherson City).[71]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces carried out a collection of missile and drone strikes in opposition to Ukraine on the night time of May 29 and 30. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast and 90 Shahed and decoy drones from the instructions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast.[72] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 26 drones and that 30 had been ”misplaced” or suppressed by Ukrainian digital warfare (EW) techniques. Ukrainian officers reported that the strikes focused civilian infrastructure in Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Odesa oblasts.[73]
Significant exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its army presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing important to report.
Note: ISW doesn’t obtain any categorized materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly accessible info, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially accessible satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial knowledge as the idea for these reviews. References to all sources used are offered within the endnotes of every replace.
[1] dot ru/ru/information/29052025
[2] ; ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051025
[3] https://x.com/kadmitriev/standing/1928358062370263088
[4] ; ; ; ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052824
[5] ; ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625
[6]
[7] ; ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725
[8] dot ru/russia/1028707 ; dot ru/politika/24094047
[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052825
[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125
[11]
[12] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29318
[13] https://t.me/rusich_army/23847
[14] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166497
[15]
[16] dot media/1030169-rf-zaavila-sklad-delegacii-na-drugi-peremovini-u-stambuli-nato-provede-nove-zasidanna-ramstajnu-1192-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1748585771&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; ; dot ua/2025/05/30/vorog-ne-mozhe-zastosovuvaty-vazhku-tehniku-dlya-nastupu-na-sumshhynu-zadiyuye-motoczykly/; https://t.me/notes_veterans/23616
[17] ; dot media/1030169-rf-zaavila-sklad-delegacii-na-drugi-peremovini-u-stambuli-nato-provede-nove-zasidanna-ramstajnu-1192-den-vijni/
[18] dot media/1030169-rf-zaavila-sklad-delegacii-na-drugi-peremovini-u-stambuli-nato-provede-nove-zasidanna-ramstajnu-1192-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1748613465&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; dot media/sumy/1030823-rosia-koncentrue-sili-na-sumsini-dla-stvorenna-novogo-placdarmu-mikola-malomuz/
[19] ; dot ua/2025/05/30/vorog-ne-mozhe-zastosovuvaty-vazhku-tehniku-dlya-nastupu-na-sumshhynu-zadiyuye-motoczykly/
[20] https://t.me/mod_russia/53285
[21] https://t.me/bella_Ciao44/8252
[22] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166580
[23] https://t.me/dva_majors/72266
[24] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29310
[25]
[26] https://t.me/bear007/68890
[27] ; ; ; ; https://t.me/sashakots/53995
[28] ; ; ;
[29] https://t.me/bear007/68890
[30] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92514
[31] ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
[32] ; dot ua/2025/05/30/vorozha-pihota-gyne-mizh-dvoma-pozycziyamy-rosiyany-testuyut-novi-shturmovi-taktyky/
[33] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31706
[34] ; ;
[35] ; ; ; ; ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31706
[36] ; ;
[37] https://t.me/yurasumy/23171
[38] https://t.me/yurasumy/23236
[39] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111624
[40] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111624
[41] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111624
[42]
[43] ;
[44] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166491
[45] ; https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/675
[46] ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64682
[47]
[48] ; ; ; ; ; ; ; https://t.me/dva_majors/72259
[49] https://t.me/dva_majors/72261
[50] ; https://t.me/epoddubny/23628
[51] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13860
[52] ; ; ;
[53] ; ; ; ;
[54]
[55] https://t.me/wargonzo/26862
[56] https://t.me/ugra_ryadom/3112
[57] ; ; ; ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64672
[58] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13861
[59] https://t.me/BlackSeaLions/52
[60] ;
[61] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166486
[62] https://t.me/voin_dv/15224
[63] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166501
[64] ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166486
[65] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166486
[66] https://t.me/voin_dv/15225
[67] https://t.me/voin_dv/15219
[68] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29312
[69] https://t.me/wargonzo/26859
[70] https://www.fb.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0223XUZ3MAvMH9Q6SsRVRynNPAioYCLhge7VwjUVrxBY75bxwwE6cR6SWZ4sfHkw9dl
[71] https://t.me/dva_majors/72333
[72] https://t.me/kpszsu/35276
[73] ; ; ; ; ; ; ; dot media/kharkiv/1012345-harkiv-atakuvali-rosijski-sahedi-detalno-pro-naslidki-udariv/ ; dot media/kharkiv/1030209-trolejbusne-depo-u-slobidskomu-rajoni-harkova-zaznalo-ataki-sahediv-poskodzeni-trolejbusi-foto-naslidkiv/; ; dot media/1030169-rf-zaavila-sklad-delegacii-na-drugi-peremovini-u-stambuli-nato-provede-nove-zasidanna-ramstajnu-1192-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1748580261&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ;
[ad_2]